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“He would be expected to crack”
Battle Exhaustion, Desertion and the Court
Martial of Lieutenant R. J. Woods
M AT T H E W BA R R E T T
Abstract : This article examines psychological breakdown, combat stress
and military justice through the 1945 general court martial of Lieutenant
Reginald James Woods. During his first day in combat with the Lake
Superior Regiment (Motor) on 17 August 1944, the twenty-five-year-old
platoon leader disappeared. Woods remerged nearly two months later in
London where he claimed to suffer from amnesia. The subsequent medical
investigation and legal proceedings forced Canadian authorities to
grapple with assumptions about combat leadership, mental responsibility
and criminal culpability. This article adopts a graphic history approach
to illustrate the subjective and contingent nature of memory and truth
through the fog of war.

I

n the weeks after d - day,

the Canadian Army endured brutal
fighting as the Allies pressed the attack against the retreating
German forces. In addition to thousands of Canadians killed in
Normandy throughout summer 1944, over one quarter of the nonfatal casualties succumbed to emotional exhaustion, mental trauma
or neuropsychiatric injury.1 While attitudes toward combat stress had
shifted since the First World War, when most sufferers had been
labelled with shell shock, many doctors and generals in 1944 still

1  
Terry Copp and Bill McAndrew, Battle Exhaustion: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in
the Canadian Army, 1939–1945 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 1990), 126; and Robert Engen, Strangers in Arms: Combat Motivation in the
Canadian Army, 1943-1945 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press,
2016), 146-47.
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believed that genuine battle exhaustion only came after a prolonged
period of struggle and fatigue that had finally drained a man’s
willpower. Worn-out but proven veterans who wavered were more
likely to receive understanding and lenient treatment from medical
officers and superiors. New reinforcements who showed nerves or
seemed to collapse too quickly were often stigmatised as predisposed
to emotional instability due to personal issues, mental abnormality or
weak character.2 In such cases, military authorities deemed discipline
and punishment as more appropriate responses to an apparent
unwillingness to fight.
The experience of one Canadian junior officer during this period
exposed the complicated medical and legal issues involved in charges
of serious military misconduct. During an advance with the Lake
Superior Regiment (LSR) toward the French town of Trun on 17
August 1944, Lieutenant (Lieut.) Reginald James Woods vanished
when his company came under enemy mortar and artillery fire. After
resurfacing in England two months later, he was subject to medical
evaluation for suspected hysteria before eventually being tried by a
general court martial for desertion. This article uses Woods’ case not
only to explore the legal, medical and administrative responses to
an officer’s failure in battle, but it also narrates his war experience
through an experimental illustrated approach called graphic history.
Following a written examination of the context and circumstances
behind the case and an explanation of graphic history as scholarship, I
visualise the events based on Woods’ personnel file and court martial
transcript. This article argues that studying the case through graphic
history makes visually clear the gaps and silences in the historical
record. Uncertainties about motivation and behaviour are particularly
evident in the fog of battle because the vast complexity and ambiguity
involved makes a complete picture from every perspective unknowable.3
Representing Woods’ unique experience therefore depends on piecing
together different accounts, corroborating from witness testimony
and acknowledging that informed imagination plays a crucial role in
the assembly of a coherent and meaningful story.

Copp and McAndrew, Battle Exhaustion, 58-59, 103-04.
Linda Warley and Alan Filewod, “Visual Silence and Graphic Memory: An
Interdisciplinary approach to Two Generals,” in Canadian Graphic: Picturing Life
Narratives, eds. Candida Rifkind and Linda Warley (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier
University Press, 2016), 153-75.
2  
3  
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leadership and combat stress
R. J. Woods, a twenty-five-year-old store clerk from Port Arthur,
Ontario, joined the LSR in France as a reinforcement officer on 16
August 1944. A motorised infantry regiment, the LSR belonged to the
4th Armoured Brigade in the 4th Canadian (Armoured) Division.4
Woods reported for duty amidst Operation Tractable in which the
4th Brigade was to play an important role in the wider Allied strategy
to close the Falaise Gap and attempt to trap hundreds of thousands
of German troops.5 The day after Woods arrived and assumed
command of No. 12 Platoon, the LSR came under a German mortar
barrage while it moved toward Trun. When his company regrouped
to continue the advance, Woods was nowhere to be found. Command
of the platoon fell to a sergeant. The inexplicable disappearance of
a platoon leader was the latest command change during the crucial
operations in Normandy. A week earlier, the LSR commanding
officer (CO) Lieutenant-Colonel (Lt.-Col.) J. E. V. Murrell had been
wounded and replaced. The 4th Brigade commander Brigadier Leslie
Booth had been killed when his tank was hit by enemy fire at the
outset of the operation on 14 August. Disruptions to the chain of
command at both senior and junior levels could undermine morale
and harm unit cohesion, which made suspected dereliction of duty a
very serious offence.
Rather than an isolated example of small-unit level failure in
battle, Woods’ disappearance must also be understood from the
perspective of breakdowns in leadership at the battalion, brigade
and division levels. Murrell’s injuries had precipitated his removal,
but he was one of several battalion commanders who had proven to
be unreliable.6 Under the stressful battlefield conditions, even some
generals began to show signs of cracking. Major-General George
Kitching, the 4th Division commander, later admitted that he had
discovered Booth drunk in his tank on 8 August. Such a serious

4  
The LSR served alongside the 21st Armoured Regiment (The Governor General’s
Foot Guards), 22nd Armoured Regiment (The Canadian Grenadier Guards) and
28th Armoured Regiment (The British Columbia Regiment).
5  
John English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of
Failure in High Command (New York: Praeger, 1991), 293-300.
6  
Angelo N. Caravaggio, “Commanding the Green Centre Line in Normandy: A Case
Study of Division Command in the Second World War” (PhD dissertation, Wilfrid
Laurier University, 2013), 403.
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breach of discipline warranted a charge under the Army Act, but
Kitching only privately reprimanded his brigadier. Historian Brian
A. Reid notes “the nagging suspicion that Kitching felt that it would
not be quite ‘on’ to subject a senior officer to the public humiliation
of a court martial, or perhaps at the least, admission to a psychiatric
hospital.”7 Booth’s death days later and Kitching’s postwar discretion
meant that the episode would not become more widely known for
years. In part due to the perceived delay of Operation Tractable to
close the Falaise Gap and concerns about his lack of drive, Kitching
himself was relieved from command and demoted on 21 August 1944.
The replacement of Murrell and Kitching, the drunkenness of Booth
and the disappearance of Woods highlighted how the Normandy
campaign exposed deficiencies in command at all levels.8
It is within this broader context of leadership problems that this
article examines the administrative, medical and legal responses
to Woods’ potential desertion. In the initial weeks after he had
vanished on 17 August, army officials sent Woods’ wife Gladys a
telegram that he had been reported missing in action. After nearly
two months, the wayward lieutenant suddenly appeared at Canadian
Military Headquarters (CMHQ) in London on 10 October 1944. As
Woods claimed memory loss, a medical officer ordered him to No. 1
Neurological Hospital, otherwise known as “No. 1 Nuts.” The hospital
based at Hackwood House near Basingstoke specialised in treating
battle exhaustion and psychoneurosis. Doctors created detailed case
histories that covered everything from patients’ childhood phobias and
sexual habits to emotional stability in civilian life and adjustments
to military service.9 The medical investigation and eventual legal
proceedings into Woods’ case reflected how Canadian authorities
grappled with assumptions about neuropsychiatric injury, criminal
culpability and expectations for good leadership.
From a medical perspective, the nature of Woods’ condition
centred on three questions: Was it a genuine illness? Was it

Brian A. Reid, No Holding Back: Operation Totalize, Normandy, August 1944
(Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2009), 302.
8  
Douglas Delaney, Corps Commanders: Five British and Canadian Generals at
War, 1939-45 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2011), 236-37.
9  
Terry Copp, “The Development of Neuropsychiatry in the Canadian Army
(Overseas) 1939-1943,” in Canadian Health Care and the State: A Century of
Evolution, ed. David Naylor (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 1992), 67-84.
7  
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attributable to combat? And was he mentally competent to have
distinguished right from wrong? One neuropsychiatric specialist
suspected that Woods’ amnesia had resulted from hysteria, but he
could not confirm whether the overall condition had been triggered
by combat stress alone, an anxious personality or a combination
of the two. Lt.-Col. C. E. G. Gould, commanding officer of the
neuropsychiatric unit at Basingstoke, believed Woods was faking
to conceal his deliberate misconduct in France. Although Gould
personally felt it had been “very reprehensible to let [Woods] go
into the reinforcement stream to lead men in battle,” he also found
no evidence of a genuine psychiatric illness that could mitigate
the lieutenant’s alleged crime.10 According to Gould, most officers
who proved unsuitable or incompetent in the field were problems of
personnel selection and training rather than cases of mental illness.
When screening reinforcement drafts for the Italian campaign,
Gould had complained that “grossly inadequate men” were being
put into combat only to be labelled psychiatric casualties after even
“mild” battle exposure.11 From this perspective, skeptical battalion
commanders and medical officers suspected that in many cases
combat only triggered a latent susceptibility to nervous collapse.
Through effective personnel screening, some Canadian Army
psychiatrists argued that officers prone to “inherent instability” could
be identified as incapable of leadership in active warfare even prior
to deployment. Major W. A. Hawke, consultant psychiatrist to the
director general of medical services, explained in April 1944: “It is
the general opinion that an unstable individual is more liable to break
down if he has a commission… The added responsibilities of an officer,
the care and handling of men, etc., make the difference.”12 While
some doctors assumed that officers whose personal backgrounds
showed signs of instability or maladjustment were more likely to
crack, the scale of neuropsychiatric casualties revealed no predictable
or consistent pattern of who could be affected.13 After D-Day,

General Court Martial [GCM] of Lieutenant [Lieut.] R. J. Woods, RG 24, reel
T-15777, file 55-W-722, Library and Archives Canada [LAC].
11  
Copp and McAndrew, Battle Exhaustion, 60-61.
12  
Minutes of Conference, Officers’ Survey and Classification Boards (OSCB), 5-6
April 1944, RG 24-C-1, reel C-5139, file 8151-10, LAC.
13  
Adam Montgomery, Invisible Injured: Psychological Trauma in the Canadian
Military from the First World War to Afghanistan (Montreal and Kingston: McGillQueen’s University Press, 2017), 67-68.
10  
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one infantry lieutenant described how assumptions about soldiers’
susceptibility to nerves did not match the reality once the fighting
began. “Some of my nervous types stood up better than the stolid
types,” he observed. “One stolid type went very fast. Some of the
nervous types are doing a grand job… I wouldn’t go so far as to say
what a man would be like.”14
Veterans of the First World War understood that the stressful
and traumatic conditions of modern warfare could produce erratic
behaviours and bizarre symptoms in even presumably normal men.
In his 1945 book, Anatomy of Courage, Lord Moran drew on his
experiences as a Royal Army Medical Corps officer in 1916 to argue
that every man possessed a finite amount of nervous energy akin
to a bank account. The daily grind of trench life slowly drained the
account while a sudden traumatic event such as a shell explosion
caused the account to become overdrawn, which triggered a mental
breakdown.15 By 1918, the British Army had instituted a form of
forward treatment to diagnose nervous patients either with shell
shock or neurasthenia. Believing that shell shock largely resulted
from the concussion blast of a shell explosion, army doctors provided
sufferers with a short rest to replenish their nervous energy before
returning them to the front. Based on evolving theories of human
behaviour, many neuropsychiatrists and psychologists claimed to
have solved the mystery of shell shock by the end of the First World
War. Postwar medical opinion assumed that the strange nervous
symptoms exhibited by sufferers signified psychogenic responses to
mental overstain rather than signs of a physical concussion injury.16
Believing that the evocative connotation of the term had ingrained
an idea that shell explosions inevitably produced nervous symptoms,
medical and military leaders largely banned shell shock as an official
diagnosis category in the Second World War. Canadian medical
officers instead attributed neurotic symptoms to battle exhaustion.17
GCM of Lieut. D. W. McKinney, RG 24, reel T-15706, file 55-M-3420, LAC.
Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage: The Classic WWI Study of the Psychological
Effects of War (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 67-69.
16  
For more on the medical history of shell shock and combat stress, see Copp and
McAndrew, Battle Exhaustion; Montgomery, Invisible Injured; Mark Humphries,
A Weary Road: Shell Shock in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018); and Meghan Fitzpatrick, Invisible
Scars: Mental Trauma and the Korean War (Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press, 2017).
17  
Copp and McAndrew, Battle Exhaustion, 13-22.
14  
15  
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The term implied that an affected soldier or officer had experienced
prolonged nervous overstrain from combat stress. As Terry Copp
outlines, “The large majority of individuals diagnosed as suffering
from Battle Exhaustion exhibited what the psychiatrists described
as acute fear reactions and acute and chronic anxiety manifested
through uncontrollable tremors, a pronounced startle reaction
to war-related sounds, and a profound loss of self-confidence.”18
Although every service member had a breaking point when
willpower became depleted, battalion commanders and medical
officers viewed with suspicion those who fell too quickly or cracked
under less than severe conditions. Doctors therefore needed to not
only treat genuine cases of breakdown in battle but also detect
instances of feigned mental illness.
Regardless of the exact cause, a psychiatric diagnosis or even
the suspicion of nerves made an officer a dangerous liability to
the performance and safety of his unit. Superiors recognised that
wavering officers needed to be replaced quickly. Those who tried but
failed to persevere might at least receive lenient treatment. Others
who evidently refused to carry out their duties invited an adverse
confidential report or worse. One “burned out” major, a Military
Cross recipient, received sympathetic consideration from his CO who
reported, “Although he tries hard and is a brave man he has had so
many hard battles that he can no longer remain steady in battle.”19 A
newly arrived officer’s admission of nervousness, alternatively, could
be interpreted by less supportive superiors as a sign of weakness and
lack of motivation. After leading a failed attack in Italy, one platoon
leader admitted that he did not want responsibility for the lives of
the thirty men under his direct command. His CO filed an adverse
report in which he concluded that the officer “is young and not battle
weary, he either lacks intestinal fortitude or else he is definitely a
conscientious objector.”20 Most officers subject to an adverse report
returned to England where they awaited a final decision on their fate;

Terry Copp, “Battle Exhaustion and the Canadian Soldier in Normandy,” in
Canadian Military History: Selected Readings, ed. Marc Milner (Toronto: Copp
Clark Pitman, 1993), 240.
19  
Confidential Report on Major G. L. F. McNeill, 9 January 1945, RG 24-C-2, vol.
10031, 9/REPORTS/5, LAC.
20  
OSCB report on Lieut. P. H. G Walker, 13 March 1945, RG 24, vol. 17497, case
no. 446, LAC.
18  
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rarely a second chance in the field, maybe an administrative posting
or, most likely, a return to Canada.

discipline and desertion
Canadian reclassification boards assessed whether these
underperforming officers would be retained for other duties or
stripped of their commissions and discharged.21 The terminology
often implied moral deficiencies and personal failings on the part
of unwanted officers. In the army the favoured term was “lack of
intestinal fortitude” while in the air force it was “lack of moral fibre.”
Such labels carried a significant stigma although many still viewed
this form of removal as less humiliating and scandalous than trial
by general court martial.22 Generals worried that an administrative
transfer, medical treatment or a return home allowed unmotivated
officers an escape from the fighting that avoided the legal punishment
of cashiering. To enforce a stronger deterrent effect and ensure that
all ranks understood the consequences of failure in battle, army
headquarters turned to the military justice system in exceptional
circumstances where an officer’s conduct appeared to border on
willful disobedience or outright cowardice.
Rooted in British military-legal precedent and tradition, the
Canadian general court martial system depended on the judgment of
five senior army officers at equivalent or higher rank than the accused
officer. A legal officer from the judge advocate general’s office (JAG)
served as prosecutor while a regimental officer, usually with legal
training, acted as defence counsel. Based on witness testimony from
superiors and subordinates, expert medical opinion and technical legal
arguments, the court was to determine guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
A judge advocate presided to give advice on matters of military law
and procedure.23 In Canada and the United Kingdom, general courts
martial tried officers for all manner of offences under the Army Act
from drunkenness and absence without leave to dishonoured cheques
Geoffrey Hayes, Crerar’s Lieutenants: Inventing the Canadian Junior Army
Officer, 1939-45 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2017), 205.
22  
Allan English, Cream of the Crop: Canadian Aircrew 1939-1945 (Montreal and
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996), 102, 118.
23  
Chris Madsen, Another Kind of Justice: Canadian Military Law from Confederation
to Somali (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1999), 77-84.
21  
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and conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. Misconduct on the
battlefield assumed greater severity as the consequences often meant
life or death and victory or defeat. The highest penalty for most
crimes was cashiering with or without imprisonment. Historically,
cashiering represented the most disgraceful form of dismissal from
military service in the British Army tradition. In a ritualised ceremony
before fellow officers, the offender’s rank pips, buttons and epaulettes
were torn from his uniform. By another historical custom—unevenly
enforced in practice—a cashiered ex-officer could never again serve
the crown in a military or civil capacity.24
For battalion commanders and general officers, failure in battle
almost never resulted in formal charges and trial by court martial.
Authorities found less public alternatives to deal with suspected
breakdowns or even misconduct like drunkenness among colonels,
brigadiers and generals. As illustrated by Booth’s case, the response
might be limited to a severe yet private “tongue-lashing.”25 A discreet
reassignment to less sensitive duties not only prevented a potential
scandal that might undermine soldiers’ confidence in their leaders,
but it also avoided the practical challenge of filling a court with
general officers to try a peer. Compared to the higher commissioned
ranks, lieutenants were far more likely to be disciplined by general
court martial.26 Sentences of dismissal and cashiering imposed on
even a few individuals served as clear warnings for the rest of the
officer corps to appreciate the penalty for misconduct.
The necessity to maintain high discipline and good morale
meant that the military justice system prioritised prosecutions for
malingering, desertion and cowardice while often treating other
minor offences and transgressions more leniently.27 Under Section 12
of the Army Act, a charge of desertion involved a deliberate evasion
of duty with no intent to return. Compared to the lesser charge of
absence without leave, desertion in a combat theatre was a relatively
uncommon though severe crime in the Canadian Army.28 Although

Matthew Barrett, Scandalous Conduct: Canadian Officer Courts Martial, 19141945 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, forthcoming).
25  
Quoted in Delaney, Corps Commanders, 236.
26  
Based on an analysis of 530 Canadian Army officer courts martial, 66 per cent
were for lieutenants. Only 1.7 per cent were for lieutenant-colonels or brigadiers.
Canadian Army Courts Martial documents, RG 24, reels T-15545 to T-15870, LAC.
27  
Engen, Strangers in Arms, 145.
28  
Engen, Strangers in Arms, 230.
24  

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2021

9

Canadian Military History, Vol. 30 [2021], Iss. 1, Art. 4
10

“He would be expected to crack”

cowardice constituted a separate offence in the Army Act, fleeing
from danger carried the implication of excessive fear or cowardly
motives. During the First World War, conviction had carried potential
execution. However, since the abolition of the death penalty for most
military crimes in 1930, typical sentences meant several years penal
servitude.29 The prison terms imposed by courts martial were as
much designed to create a deterrent for the entire army as they were
to punish an individual offender. Harsh justice served as retribution
against convicted individuals who had evidently abandoned comrades,
especially during major offensives.30
Following his discharge from Basingstoke under the suspicion
of malingering, Woods became the target of the Canadian military
justice system. Authorities placed him under arrest and returned
him to the LSR in Holland where a summary of evidence and initial
witness statements could be recorded. Facing a general court martial
for desertion in February 1945, Woods still claimed he remembered
nothing after his disappearance in France. The defence counsel, Lieut.
E. J. McCormick, argued that Woods could not be held criminally
responsible because his breakdown proved he should never have been
medically cleared to join a reinforcement draft in the first place.
Senior officers serving on a court martial board considered medical
evidence of neuropsychiatric injury when judging criminal liability
but most were inclined to reject mental illness as a defence against
charges of serious military misconduct.31 The prosecuting officer,
Captain E. L. Marrus, gathered eye-witnesses and medical experts
to prove Woods criminally culpable for his entire illegal absence. As
the judge advocate, Major G. M. Graham, explained: “the object of
every court martial… is to determine questions of fact and law—did
the facts alleged against the accused actually happen?”32
What did actually happen to Lieut. Woods? Had he consciously
fled only to feign amnesia? Or had he suffered a genuine mental
breakdown that trigged sudden loss of identity and memory? The

David French, “Discipline and the Death Penalty in the British Army in the War
against Germany during the Second World War,” Journal of Contemporary History
33, 4 (1998): 531-45.
30  
Teresa Iacobelli, Death or Deliverance, Death or Deliverance: Canadian Courts
Martial in the Great War (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press,
2013), 107.
31  
Madsen, Another Kind of Justice, 82-85.
32  
GCM of Lieut. R. J. Woods, RG 24, reel T-15777, file 55-W-722, LAC.
29  
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doctor’s diagnosis and the verdict of court members gave the impression
of great certainty that Woods was in fact a deceptive deserter. Yet
for a case centred on incomplete memories, conflicting testimony and
legal technicalities, the incident contained more ambiguities, silences
and doubts than a written recounting of the facts implied.

why graphic history?
To explore the complexities and nuances in Woods’ case, this article
adopts an experimental graphic history approach to illustrate the
subjective and contingent nature of memory and truth through the
fog of war. While still a relatively novel concept as scholarship, graphic
history uses drawings and sequential art to create new opportunities
for historical representation, interpretation and analysis.33 Graphic
historians base their work on available documentation and research,
but the need to make artistic and creative choices highlights the
inherent gaps in the historical record and exposes the limitations of
any claim to merely reproduce an objective reconstruction of the past.
I elaborate on the academic validity of graphic history and address
the challenges of this methodology in another article within this
issue of Canadian Military History. I argue that “graphic histories
by their visual nature make evident that which written history can
often obscure—fictive elements and informed imagination are central
to the production of any historical narrative whether told primarily
by text or primarily by illustration.”34
Reading graphic histories requires the same critical thinking
skills used when assessing any written work, but appreciating the

There is a growing academic literature on the use and production of graphic
history as scholarship and in education. Rob Kristofferson and Simon Orpana,
“Shaping Graphic History: Primary Sources and Closure in Showdown! Making
Modern Unions,” Labour/Le Travail 82 (2018): 189-226; Hugo Frey and Benjamin
Noys, “History in the Graphic Novel,” Rethinking History 6, 3 (2002): 255-60; and
Sean Carleton, “Drawn to Change: Comics and Critical Consciousness,” Labour/Le
Travail 73 (2014): 154-60.
34  
Matthew Barrett, “Historical Thinking and Visual Literacy: Exploring the
Canadian War Museum with Graphic History,” Canadian Military History 30, 1
(2021), 11.
33  
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meaning of imagery also requires visual literacy.35 Recognising the
subtlety of visual cues such as colour, style and layout is central
to understanding the arguments and interpretations being presented
by the artist and historian. The pictures therefore do not simply
dramatise the text of an otherwise fairly dense archival court file. In
this case, visualising the recollections of Woods, his doctors and other
witnesses serves to identify key differences in the pictures presented
to the court members. Throughout the trial, the prosecuting officer
and defence counsel referred to these imagined pictures as each side
crafted their own version of events based on medical evidence and
stories from witness testimony.
The images and the text of this article interact to show how
assumptions about a range of concepts, including medical unfitness,
willpower, mental illness and military law, shaped the perspectives of
participants in the court martial. As the images are meant to reflect
individual perceptions of the same incident, the article does not aim
to reconstruct the case with precise authenticity nor definitively
claim what actually happened to Woods. Instead, the illustrated
narratives invite the reader to consider how the formal structure
of the court martial, the quality of the evidence, the influence of
individual memories and the gaps in the historical record contributed
to creating the visual interpretations. The sequential art depicted in
any graphic history is purposefully incomplete. As Alyson King notes
in “Cartooning History,” graphic narratives require “read[ing] beyond
the surface of the story.”36 When explaining the relationship between
reader and art, comic book scholars refer to ideas of the “gutter” and
“closure.”37 The gutter represents the blank space that separates each
panel. Closure occurs when the reader completes the sequence of art
by mentally linking one image to the next. Fragments of graphic and
textual information are assembled to achieve closure, but readers may
question to what extent closure can ever be complete or certain in a
court martial that relied heavily on imperfect or missing memories.
Visually, this graphic history draws inspiration from the classic
war cartoons of Bill Mauldin and Bing Coughlin as well as from Scott
35  
Michael Pagliaro, “Is a Picture Worth a Thousand Words? Determining the
Criteria for Graphic Novels with Literary Merit,” The English Journal 103, 4
(2014): 31-45.
36  
Alyson E. King, “Cartooning History: Canada’s Stories in Graphic Novel,” The
History Teacher 45, 2 (2012): 201.
37  
Sean Carleton, “Drawn to Change,” 162-63.
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Chantler’s Two Generals, a graphic memoir based on the Second
World War experiences of his grandfather.38 The text is adapted from
Woods’ court martial transcript itself, as well as from medical reports
and written petitions in Woods’ army personnel file. My depiction of
the main historical figures in this case—the accused officer (Woods),
the prosecutor (Marrus), the defence counsel (McCormick), the judge
advocate (Graham), the court president (Ware) and medical witness
(Gould)—are based on available photographic references for each man.
The faces of other named individuals, namely the other witnesses,
are purposefully obscured or abstracted due to the lack of clear
visual references. This limitation, however, serves another purpose
to emphasise that the statements are being visualised through the
individual witness’ point-of-view. The footnotes document the sources
for the illustrations and explain creative choices.

Scott Chantler, Two Generals (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 2010).

38  
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Footnote39

Casualty telegram to his wife is reproduced from Lieut. Woods’ army personnel file.
RG 24, file 332-103-220, LAC.
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Footnote40
Woods’ narration (in white text boxes) on the next three pages quoted from the
summary of evidence taken on 14 November 1944, contained in his GCM file, RG 24,
reel T-15777, file 55-W-722, LAC.
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Footnote41
Woods’ identification card is reproduced from his army personnel file. Canadian
Military Headquarters (CMHQ) was located at 2–4 Cockspur Street, London (now
Canada House).
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Footnote42

The CMHQ medical officer’s sick report, dated 10 October 1944, is reproduced
from Woods’ personnel file. Dr. Arthur Frank Chaisson’s diagnosis report, dated
14 October 1944, is quoted from Woods’ personnel file. Chaisson (1903-1960), a
graduate of Harvard University, was a Doctor of Public Health and director of
mental hygiene in New Brunswick before the war.
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Footnote43

During the First World War, hypnosis had been a controversial treatment for shell
shock and was met with skepticism from traditionalist physicians. Tracey Loughran,
Shell-Shock and Medical Culture in First World War Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2017), 103-05. As the psychological basis of battle exhaustion
gained wider acceptance in the medical community, by the Second World War some
army doctors turned to hypnotic techniques to recover lost memories although
suspicions remained about efficacy. In psychiatry, a fugue state refers to a rare
neurological or psychological condition that involves the patient’s claimed loss of
identity. Symptoms include confusion, amnesia, erratic behaviours and inexplicable
travel over long distances. For a contemporary understanding, see Charles Fisher,
“Amnesic States in War Neuroses: The Psychogenesis of Fugues,” Psychoanalytic
Quarterly 4, 4 (1945): 437-68.
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Footnote44
Above scene is based on the photograph The Lake Superior Regiment leaving
Port Arthur on Red River Road, 10 October 1940; see http://images.ourontario.
ca/gateway/56241/data. Middle photo is: Lake Superior Regiment (LSR), “A”
Company, RV9 285/X3, LAC. Recruited from northern Ontario, the LSR mobilised
for active service in November 1940. The unit was re-designated a motor battalion
in January 1942. George Stanley, In the Face of Danger: The History of the Lake
Superior Regiment (Port Arthur: Lake Superior Scottish Regiment, 1960), 84.
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Footnote45

A Universal Carrier of The Lake Superior Regiment, Cintheaux, France, 8 August
1944, photograph, PA-113651, LAC. The drawn map is adapted from A Brief History
of the 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade in Action, July 1944-May 1945 (Mitcham,
UK: West Brothers, 1945), 51.
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Footnote46
For the action on 17 August 1944, the LSR war diary only referred to the advancing
column as composed of “vehicles” and Woods’ court martial file only described his
as the “platoon command vehicle.” As a motorised infantry regiment attached to an
armoured brigade, the LSR would have had trucks, half-tracks and universal carriers.
I have depicted Woods in a universal carrier as an artistic choice because he can be
seen more clearly in an open-air vehicle rather than in an enclosed half-track. LSR
War Diary, RG 24-C-3, vol. 15098, file 942, LAC.
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Footnote47
Woods’ biographical sketch quoted on this and the previous three pages is from his
personnel file. The original transcript is torn and therefore incomplete. Dr. Chaisson
had encouraged the amnesic lieutenant to write down all that he remembered about
his life. Woods had first joined the Non-Permanent Active Militia (NPAM) in 1935.
He rose to the rank of sergeant in the peacetime LSR but accepted a reduction to
private when he volunteered with the Active Army for overseas service in October
1940. He had married his wife Gladys in Port Arthur in 1940 shortly after enlisting.
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Footnote48

Image in bottom right evokes Tom Lea’s painting The Two Thousand Yard Stare
(1945). Image in bottom middle refers to the infamous incident when US Army
General George Patton struck two American GIs suspected to have been suffering
from battle exhaustion. For the Patton slapping incident, see Dwight D. Eisenhower,
Crusade in Europe (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1948), 179–80.
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Footnote49

Gould’s diagnosis report, dated 1 November 1944, is reproduced from Woods’
personnel file. Dr. Charles Ernest Groves Gould (1908-1990), a graduate of the
University of Southern California, had served as a neuropsychiatric specialist with
the Canadian Army since April 1942.
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Footnote50

During the summary of evidence, Woods faced two charges under the Army Act—
Section 12 (desertion) and Section 5(7) (cowardice). Prosecutors dropped the latter
charge before the proceedings began. Although the summary of evidence was held
before LSR senior officers in Holland in November 1944, the trial was convened in the
United Kingdom in February 1945. Throughout the war, even courts martial held in
the UK were often listed as having taken place “in the field” for security purposes.
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Footnote51
Major Gordon Mitchell Graham (1904-1971), a Nova Scotia lawyer, served as judge
advocate on several Canadian courts martial. Some verdicts were later quashed due
to Graham’s errors when directing court members on technical legal matters. Colonel
Cameron Bethel Ware (1913-1999) had served as CO of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian
Light Infantry in the Italian campaign until June 1944. Captain Elliott Lloyd Marrus
(1913-1996) was a Toronto lawyer who joined the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps
and later served with the JAG corps. Lieutenant Edward Joseph McCormick (19101997) was a Calgary criminal lawyer who had served with the NPAM since 1930.
Just two weeks before Woods’ trial, McCormick had appeared before a reclassification
board, which recommended putting him into action as an infantry officer, but he
remained engaged in army legal work. OSCB, case no. 596. RG 24, vol. 17497, LAC.
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Footnote52

All witness testimony and court dialogue are quoted from Woods’ GCM file, RG 24,
reel T-15777, file 55-W-722, LAC.
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Footnote53
Isidoriou recalled seeing a haemorrhage in Woods’ right ear, suggesting a head wound
or brain injury. After Gould claimed Woods confessed to deception, the lieutenant had
slipped away from Basingstoke to Brighton in early November 1944. He resurfaced
again at Isidoriou’s house before the civil police took him back to the hospital. Although
Isidoriou related this incident in the summary of evidence, defence counsel McCormick
kept it out of the court martial record. Leaving hospital without permission technically
constituted a separate military crime for which Woods was not charged.
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Footnote54

Page is reproduced from War Office, Manual of Military Law (London: His Majesty’s
Stationery Office, 1907), 74.
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Footnote55
An unsworn statement allowed the accused to address the court without being crossexamined by the prosecutor. As the judge advocate warned, unsworn statements
carried little weight with court members.
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Footnote56

Each red chevron on the sleeve of a uniform marked 12-months’ active service. The
white chevron noted at least one-year of military service prior to September 1939.
In his plea for mitigation, McCormick begged the court to consider this long service
in sentencing. The defence counsel pointed out that cashiering would deny Woods’
access to veteran grants and benefits from the federal government.
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Footnote57

Major-General P. J. Montague, chief of staff at CMHQ, confirmed Woods’ sentence,
although he remitted seven years from the twelve-year prison term.
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Footnote58

The quotes from petitions that Woods wrote in prison are contained in his GCM file.
His Majesty’s (HM) Prison Dartmoor was built in the Napoleonic Wars. During the
world wars, it held civilian convicts, military prisoners and conscientious objectors.
Woods began his imprisonment in March 1945 at HM Prison Winchester before
being transferred to Dartmoor.
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Footnote59

After V-E Day, Canadian soldiers in Europe could volunteer for service in the Pacific
theatre where the war against Japan was not yet over. Unlike Woods, a small number
of Canadian soldier-convicts received early release with the promise to re-enlist for
this campaign that never came. Japan surrendered on 2 September 1945.
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Footnote60

Document is reproduced from Woods’ GCM file. Brigadier R. J. Orde served as
Canada’s Judge Advocate General from 1920 to 1950. Upon Woods’ return to
Canada in March 1946, he was held at No. 89 Detention Barracks in Fort Henry,
Kingston until his release in June.
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Footnote61

Woods’ campaign and service medals (clockwise from upper left): Canadian Volunteer
Service Medal (with clasp), War Medal 1939-45, France and Germany Star, Defence
Medal and 1939-45 Star. When applying for a visa to move to the United States in
1955, Woods requested a copy of his discharge papers to validate honourable release
status. Due to the quashed sentence, his service record appeared no different than
most fellow Canadian veterans.
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epilogue
Based on the recommendation of Judge Advocate General R. J. Orde,
the conviction against Woods was quashed, which “relieved [him]
from all consequences of his trial.”62 Thus, from a legal standpoint,
the entire incident was supposed to be expunged from Woods’ record.
However, from an administrative perspective, Woods had still been
absent for fifty-five days and had remained inactive for several more
months while in hospital, at trial and in prison. Unsatisfied that
a legal technicality had evidently let Woods off easy, some army
officials wanted to impose a financial punishment. As Woods had
not performed any military duties, vice adjutant-general W. H. S.
Macklin argued that the lieutenant should forfeit all pay from his
disappearance on 17 August 1944 until his release from confinement
on 15 June 1946. Macklin explained that the choice between paying
or not “depends entirely on what we may consider would be just
and fair to this officer and to the taxpayers.”63 Although the trial
had been declared void, Macklin and other army officials still cited
Gould’s medical opinion that Woods had deliberately evaded duty.
The deputy adjutant-general remarked, “Morally, I think such
forfeiture is justified. Legally, however, I am not so sure.”64
Orde countered that Woods’ failure to perform military service
while confined to Basingstoke as a patient, when under arrest or
when in a penitentiary could hardly be considered “voluntary on his
part.”65 Army adjutant-general E. G. Weeks decided Woods would
lose only fifty-five days’ pay from 17 August until his reappearance
at CMHQ on 10 October. The decision on length of eligible service
had important implications on claims for the war service gratuity,
veteran grants and rehabilitation credits.66 The debate over pay
signalled the army’s desire to find a logical and consistent resolution
to a complicated case. Macklin, who blamed Woods for the entire

P.C. 1089, 11 June 1946, RG 24, reel T-15777, file 55-W-722, LAC.
W. H. S. Macklin to R. J. Orde, 8 July 1946, RG 24, reel T-15777, file 55-W-722, LAC.
64  
H. D. Howard to W. H. S. Macklin, 6 July 1946, RG 24, reel T-15777, file 55-W722, LAC.
65  
R. J. Orde to W. H. S. Macklin, 10 July 1946, RG 24, reel T-15777, file 55-W-722, LAC.
66  
With six years’ service including three and a half years overseas (excluding fiftyfive days), Woods earned a War Service Grant plus rehabilitation grants and reestablishment credits for $2,471.81. Adjusted for inflation, this would amount to
$37,318.96 in 2021. Bank of Canada Inflation Calculator, accessed 18 March 2021,
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/rates/related/inflation-calculator/.
62  
63  
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incident, argued that “logic indicates ‘all’ or ‘nothing.’”67 Framing
the problem around Woods’ alleged amnesia meant that Macklin
could only see the lieutenant as either a mentally ill patient who
deserved all compensation or a willful deserter who earned nothing.
By only forfeiting a fraction of Woods’ pay, army administration
struck a compromise that acknowledged he had been illegally absent
for causes unknown but avoided passing judgement on his mental
health at the time.
Despite incomplete details and conflicting accounts, this history
when documented through the law or medicine tended to privilege a
single, coherent narrative. Woods was either guilty or not. He was
either mentally responsible or not. He was either legitimately ill or
faking. A graphic history approach requires readers to confront the
incompleteness of the historical record in Woods’ case. A court martial
connected fragments of evidence largely from witness testimony to
determine what happened beyond a reasonable doubt. A medical
diagnosis likewise pieced together information and observations to
separate a genuine condition from malingering. Connecting selected
visual and written elements is necessary to fill gaps in the court
proceedings, the medical evidence, the witness accounts and the
accused’s own memory. This process of informed imagination allows
for multiple possible interpretations to make sense of the past, but it
also exposes the limits of history, whether in graphic form or text, to
pierce the fog of war.
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67  
W. H. S. Macklin to R.J. Orde, 8 July 1946, RG 24, reel T-15777, file 55-W722, LAC.
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